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GAME OVER? WHY RECENT STATE SUPREME
COURT DECISIONS SHOULD END THE ATTEMPTED
EXPANSION OF PUBLIC NUISANCE LAW
VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ,* PHIL GOLDBERG** & COREY SCHAECHER***
Introduction
Over the past decade, public nuisance theory has been the tort de jour for
speculative, high-publicity, and high-stakes lawsuits brought by state attorneys
general and contingency-fee lawyers against product manufacturers.  Plaintiffs
have been attempting to convert what are in reality class-action-size products
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1. See Victor E. Schwartz & Phil Goldberg, The Law of Public Nuisance: Maintaining
Rational Boundaries on a Rational Tort, 45 WASHBURN L.J. 541 (2006).
2. See id. at 543, 562-70.
3. See id. at 562.
4. See id. at 563-64.
5. Id. at 545-46.
liability lawsuits into government-led public nuisance claims in an effort to
dodge traditional products liability defenses, such as product identification,
causation, and statutes of limitation.  Now, several of these cases have
concluded, and four state high courts, a state legislature, and a jury have all
reached the same result.  In each instance, the attempt to expand public
nuisance beyond its original moorings failed.  As several high courts have now
explained, these types of cases fit neither the character nor elements of the tort
of public nuisance. 
Four years ago, we looked at this budding trend and wrote an article
discussing this novel application of public nuisance theory in the context of the
tort’s historical development.1  As we wrote then, public nuisance is a
centuries-old tort with a narrow application to a specific and well-defined set
of elements.2  The purpose of public nuisance has historically been to allow
governments to use the tort system to stop private individuals from engaging
in conduct that unreasonably interferes with a right that is common to the
general public.3  Accordingly, public nuisance is a conduct-based tort—not a
manufacturing-based tort4—and has most often been used in the absence of
local ordinances prohibiting certain conduct.5  
Consider, for example, a common right to quiet in the late night hours.  The
owner of a tavern who permits loud bands on the premises could be sued under
public nuisance theory to reduce the noise level during these hours, even if the
town’s ordinances did not specifically outlaw that activity.  The same is true
for drunken vagrants who may interfere with the use of public sidewalks, or
individuals who intentionally pollute public waterways.  In none of these
cases, however, is the manufacturer of the product that may have been an
instrument in causing the harm subject to liability.  The makers of the
instruments played by the band, the alcohol drunk by the vagrant, or the
chemicals dumped by the polluters are not responsible for policing consumers
to ensure proper use of their products.
Recent lawsuits, however, have tried to break this mold.  State, county, and
municipal attorneys have sued manufacturers for harms allegedly caused by
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6. For a thorough exploration of the principal cases, see id. at 552-61 (discussing cases
involving asbestos, tobacco, firearms, and lead paint pigment); see also discussion infra Part
II.
7. See, e.g., Texas v. Am. Tobacco Co., 14 F. Supp. 2d 956 (E.D. Tex. 1997).
8. See, e.g., Detroit Bd. of Educ. v. Celotex Corp., 493 N.W.2d 513 (Mich. Ct. App.
1992).
9. See, e.g., City of St. Louis v. Benjamin Moore & Co., 226 S.W.3d 110 (Mo. 2007).
10. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009); see also
discussion infra Part III.B.
their products’ users, and as is often the case, misusers.6  The theory these
laintiffs advance is akin to suing an electric guitar manufacturer for all public
nuisances caused by bands that play music too loudly.  This type of lawsuit is
illogical and contrary to the historical application of public nuisance law.
Undeterred, plaintiffs tried to gain traction with this new approach by focusing
on “unpopular” companies—those that manufacture products that may be used
by third parties to harm others or that these plaintiffs view as contributing to
some larger social ill.  
Consider the main targets for these new public nuisance actions—cigarette
manufacturers have been sued for states’ medical costs of treating smokers,7
asbestos producers for exposure-related ailments,8 lead paint and pigment
manufacturers for harms associated with ingestion of deteriorating lead paint
by children,9 and energy producers for allegedly contributing to global climate
change.10  In short, these plaintiffs have sought to distort public nuisance
theory into an unrecognizable, catch-all cause of action that could be molded
to fit the next mass-tort litigation.
The rulings and legislative enactments issued to date make clear that courts
and legislatures are unwilling to redefine public nuisance or to morph it into
a “super tort” capable of overcoming longstanding products liability principles.
To this end, Section I of this Article provides a brief history of public nuisance
law.  Section II discusses the rejection of public nuisance theory for product-
based suits in Illinois, Missouri, New Jersey, Rhode Island, Ohio, and
Wisconsin.  Finally, Section III looks to the future, assessing the public
nuisance cases that are currently being litigated across the country.
I. A Brief History of Public Nuisance Law
Suing product manufacturers under public nuisance theory for alleged
product-related injuries is a development of only the last few decades, and
represents a far departure from the tort’s centuries-old roots.
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2010
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11. An important distinction must be made between the torts of public nuisance and private
nuisance.  The torts are often confused but “have almost nothing in common, except that each
causes inconvenience to someone.”  W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS § 86, at 618 (5th ed. 1984).  Scholars suggest that “it would have been fortunate
if they had been called from the beginning by different names.”  Id.  The unifying factor
between them, though, “is the interest invaded, namely either the public right or the private
interest in the use and enjoyment of land.”  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822 cmt. a
(1979). 
XXThe focus of a private nuisance suit is conflicting land uses that interfere with an
individual’s use of her own land, whereas public nuisance focuses on the impact to a right held
by the public at large.  See 66 C.J.S. Nuisances § 7 (2009).  The Restatement (Second) of Torts
defines “private nuisance” as “a nontrespassory invasion of another’s interest in the private use
and enjoyment of land” and limits recovery “only to those who have property rights and
privileges in respect to the use and enjoyment of the land affected.”  RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS §§ 821D, 821E (emphasis added).  Four types of land uses have commonly been
recognized by courts as potentially giving rise to a claim for private nuisance: noise, odor,
physical invasion by particles, and safety or environmental hazards.  Robert D. Dodson,
Rethinking Private Nuisance Law: Recognizing Aesthetic Nuisances in the New Millenium, 10
S.C. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 1 (2002).
12. See Schwartz & Goldberg, supra note 1, at 543 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 821B cmt. a).
13. Joseph W. Cleary, Comment, Municipalities Versus Gun Manufacturers: Why Public
Nuisance Claims Just Do Not Work, 31 U. BALT. L. REV. 273, 277 (2002). 
14. See 58 AM. JUR. 2D Nuisances § 31 (2002). 
15. Schwartz & Goldberg, supra note 1, at 545.  During the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries, public nuisance cases primarily involved obstruction of public highways and
waterways, although a handful involved property uses that otherwise conflicted with the public
A. Development of the Public Nuisance Cause of Action11
The tort of public nuisance originated in twelfth-century English common
law, where the king would enjoin infringement on the Crown’s land and force
an offending party to repair any damages.12  From inception, then, public
nuisance law was limited to providing injunctive relief or abatement for
interferences with the property of the sovereign.  In the fourteenth century, the
tort was expanded beyond the king’s land to include all “public rights,” such
as “the right to safely walk along public highways, to breathe unpolluted air,
to be undisturbed by large gatherings of disorderly people and to be free from
the spreading of infectious diseases.”13  Public rights were construed as those
likely to be encountered equally by any member of society, but did not include
damage to private property or other infringements of personal or private
rights.14
As American courts adopted the English common law, public nuisance
theory retained its narrow underpinnings and was used to enjoin
nontrespassory invasions on the use and enjoyment of public lands.15  During
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol62/iss4/1
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morals or social welfare, including gambling halls, taverns, and brothels.  See Robert Abrams
& Val Washington, The Misunderstood Law of Public Nuisance: A Comparison With Private
Nuisance Twenty Years After Boomer, 54 ALB. L. REV. 359, 361-62 (1990); Denise E. Antolini,
Modernizing Public Nuisance: Solving the Paradox of the Special Injury Rule, 28 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 755, 769-70 (2001). 
16. Schwartz & Goldberg, supra note 1, at 546. 
17. Richard O. Faulk & John S. Gray, Alchemy in the Courtroom? The Transmutation of
Public Nuisance Litigation, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 941, 953. 
18. Donald G. Gifford, Public Nuisance as a Mass Products Liability Tort, 71 U. CIN. L.
REV. 741, 804 (2003). 
19. Schwartz & Goldberg, supra note 1, at 546. 
20. See Mary B. Spector, Crossing the Threshold: Examining the Abatement of Public
Nuisances Within the Home, 31 CONN. L. REV. 547, 551-52 (1999). 
21. See id. at 551.
22. Id.
the Industrial Revolution of the mid-1800s, as changes in land use gave rise
to suits over what uses should be permissible where,16 public nuisance theory
“was used to address other perceived invasions of public morals and the public
welfare.”17  Without significant state or local regulations in place, public
nuisance suits became a substitute for such regulations, since governments
“could not anticipate and explicitly prohibit or regulate through legislation all
the particular activities that might injure . . . the general public.”18  By the
1930s, states and localities had begun enacting statutes and ordinances
defining public nuisance and giving the government the authority to prohibit
certain conduct.19  Tort action under public nuisance theory was seen as a
preferable remedy to criminal prosecution in these instances because the cases
dealt with low-level quasi crimes, and rather than simply penalize the offender,
courts could require him or her to abate the harm he or she caused.20  Thus,
unlike criminal fines or jail time, a tort action for abatement could be used to
minimize or eliminate any threat to the public health or safety.21  Furthermore,
because criminal prosecution was (and is) largely ineffective against a
corporate defendant, public officials had to turn to equitable remedies to
ensure that the offending party was held responsible for the alleged harm.22
Courts applying public nuisance theory have traditionally required that four
specific elements be present to subject one to liability under the tort: (1)
infringement of a public right—the injury must be to a right that is common
to everyone in the general public; (2) unreasonable conduct—the defendant
must have unreasonably interfered with that public right in creating the public
nuisance; (3) control—the defendant must have been in control of the public
nuisance, either at the time of abatement or when the injury occurred,
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2010
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23. See Schwartz & Goldberg, supra note 1, at 562-70.  Like governmental plaintiffs,
private plaintiffs may also bring public nuisance action, but must establish an additional
element—namely, that they suffered particular damages that are different in kind, not merely
degree, from the damages suffered by the general public.  See William L. Prosser, Private
Action for Public Nuisance, 52 VA. L. REV. 997, 1005-06 (1966).  The classic example involves
an individual who is delayed by a man-made ditch in a public highway; the individual suffers
no injury different from the rest of the general public from the delay alone, no matter its
duration.  See id.  If the individual’s cart was damaged as a result of the ditch, however, the
individual has suffered damages different in kind.  See id. at 1005, 1008.  In these
circumstances, a private plaintiff is able to recover monetary damages.  See id. at 1005-06.  By
contrast, abatement has traditionally not been a remedy available to private plaintiffs.  See id.
24. Hydro-Mfg., Inc. v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 640 A.2d 950, 958 (R.I. 1994).
25. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B cmt. g (1979).  The Restatement
commentary continues:
Thus the pollution of a stream that merely deprives fifty or a hundred lower
riparian owners of the use of the water for purposes connected with their land does
not for that reason alone become a public nuisance.  If, however, the pollution
prevents the use of a public bathing beach or kills the fish in a navigable stream
and so deprives all members of the community of the right to fish, it becomes a
public nuisance.
Id.
26. See Gifford, supra note 18, at 800.
27. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B cmt. g.; see also supra note 25.
28. Higgins v. Conn. Light & Power Co., 30 A.2d 388, 391 (Conn. 1943) (quoting Nolan
v. City of New Britain, 38 A. 703, 706 (Conn. 1897)).  Moreover, no person need actually
encounter the public nuisance for liability to exist.  Schwartz & Goldberg, supra note 1, at 562.
depending on the court; and (4) proximate cause—the defendant’s actions had
to be the proximate cause of the public nuisance or the harm alleged.23 
Over time, courts have established and explained the boundaries of each of
these elements:
Injury to a Public Right: The initial question in public nuisance cases is
whether the alleged nuisance interferes “with a right common to the general
public.”24  A public right “is collective in nature and not like the individual
right that everyone has not to be assaulted or defamed or defrauded or
negligently injured.”25  Public rights traditionally included such rights as
access to public highways and waterways.26  Thus, an individual’s blockading
of a public road may be a public nuisance.  Blocking a private driveway,
however, could never be a public nuisance because the act infringes only on
the homeowner’s private right to use his or her driveway.  Furthermore, the
number of private driveways a person blocks is irrelevant, as an aggregation
of infringements of private rights does not equal an infringement of a public
right.27  As one court explained, “The test is not the number of persons
annoyed, but the possibility of annoyance to the public by the invasion of its
rights.”28
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol62/iss4/1
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The only question for the court is whether a person would be harmed by the public nuisance if
the person encountered it while exercising a public right.  Id.
29. See Schwartz & Goldberg, supra note 1, at 564 (citing KEETON ET AL., supra note 11,
§ 86, at 618).
30. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B.
31. See Victor Schwartz et al., Can Governments Impose a New Tort Duty To Prevent
External Risks?  The “No-Fault” Theories Behind Today’s High-Stakes Government
Recoupment Suits, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 923, 957-60 (2009). 
32. Id. at 958.
33. See Friends of the Sakonnet v. Dutra, 738 F. Supp. 623, 633-34 (D.R.I. 1990). 
34. City of Manchester v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 637 F. Supp. 646, 656 (D.R.I. 1986).  
35. See, e.g., City of Bloomington v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 891 F.2d 611 (7th Cir.
1989).
Unreasonable Conduct: The interference with the public right must be
unreasonable.  Historically, conduct giving rise to public nuisance liability was
quasi-criminal, such as running a house of ill-repute.29  In recent years,
however, courts have used the standard of unreasonable conduct articulated in
the Restatement (Second) of Torts.30  For example, blockading a public street
pursuant to a government contract to repair the roadway would not be
unreasonable.  Blocking the same road as part of a protest without a permit,
however, might be.  Public nuisance theory excuses liability for conduct that
occurs within a well-regulated regime, as conduct that is permitted by the
government cannot be deemed unreasonable, even when that conduct is
risky.31  For example, the Environmental Protection Agency sets the National
Ambient Air Quality Standards, which permit manufacturers to emit certain
amounts of chemicals into the air.32  The existence of such standards dictates
that emissions within the established limits cannot give rise to public nuisance
liability. 
Control: Control of the instrumentality giving rise to the alleged nuisance
is always an element of the tort of public nuisance, although courts tend to
disagree over whether control should be evaluated at the time of abatement or
at the time the injury occurred.  One court described the control element as the
“paramount” requirement for public nuisance liability.33  Those courts
evaluating control at the time of abatement have held that “[i]f the defendants
exercised no control over the instrumentality, then a remedy directed against
them is of little use.”34  Other courts assess the element of control at the time
of injury.35 For example, in City of Bloomington v. Westinghouse Electric
Corp., the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that while Monsanto made
polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) and sold them to Westinghouse, Monsanto
as the manufacturer could not be held liable for any public nuisance that
allegedly resulted when Westinghouse allowed the chemicals to leach into the
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2010
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36. See id. at 612, 614.
37. Id. at 614 (citing County of Johnson ex rel. Bd. of Educ., v. U.S. Gypsum Co. 580 F.
Supp 284, 294 (E.D. Tenn. 1984), modified on other grounds, 664 F. Supp. 1127 (E.D. Tenn.
1985)).
38. See 57A AM. JUR. 2D Negligence § 415 (2004).  Cause in fact may be proved by
satisfying a “but for” test, a “substantial factor” test, or a substitute causation analysis such as
res ipsa loquitur.  See id. § 446; 57B AM. JUR. 2D Negligence § 1163 (2004). 
39. Schwartz & Goldberg, supra note 1, at 569.
40. See In re Lead Paint Litig., 924 A.2d 484, 498-99 (N.J. 2007) (citing RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) TORTS § 821C(1) (1979)).
41. Id.  
42. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.  This Article is intended to focus almost
exclusively on suits pursued by governmental entities.  Accordingly, a discussion of public
nuisance suits brought by private plaintiffs and the accompanying rule variances is limited to
a brief summary of emerging developments in Part III.  See infra note 224.
city’s sewer system.36  The court explained that “Westinghouse was in control
of the product purchased and was solely responsible for the nuisance it created
by not safely disposing of the product.”37
Causation: As with any tort, a plaintiff must establish causation to prevail
in a public nuisance action.  The causation analysis is the same as that for other
torts and requires a showing of both factual cause and proximate (legal) cause.
Thus, the defendant’s wrongful conduct must be established as a cause in fact
of the plaintiff’s injury,38 and “the injury to the plaintiff must be the type of
injury that a reasonable person would see as a likely result of her conduct.”39
Only when all four elements are satisfied—injury to a public right,
unreasonable conduct, control, and proximate causation—can a defendant be
held liable under public nuisance theory.  But once these elements have been
established, the extent of liability is extremely limited.  A government entity
can only seek to enjoin the defendant’s conduct or have the defendant abate
the nuisance.40  It is a “time honored” principle that governments cannot seek
money damages when alleging public nuisance.41  Separate rules exist
regarding when private plaintiffs have standing to pursue a public nuisance
claim and the types of remedies they may seek; however, even in such cases,
the same four elements outlined above must be shown in order to establish a
defendant’s public nuisance liability.42
B. History of the Attempted Expansion of Public Nuisance Law
The initial push to expand public nuisance theory began with the
environmental community during the drafting of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts.  Environmental lawyers understood that if the hardened elements of the
tort were relaxed or eliminated, public nuisance theory could become a very
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol62/iss4/1
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43. See generally Antolini, supra note 15.
44. Environmentalists’ attempts to broaden private-citizen standing would have
significantly expanded public nuisance claims as state regulations restricting certain conduct
became more common.  Environmentalists and the drafters of the Restatement reached a
compromise, by which individuals were given standing when suing “as a representative of the
general public, as a citizen in a citizen’s action or as a member of a class in a class action.”
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821C(2)(c).  Environmentalists also sought to expand the
tort by conferring standing to anyone allegedly affected by a public nuisance.  Schwartz &
Goldberg, supra note 1, at 548. Such an expansion, however, was wholly rejected.  Id.  The
drafters of the Restatement realized that such a broad interpretation of standing would have
abrogated the traditional requirement that a private plaintiff must have suffered an injury
different in kind from that suffered by the general public.  See id.; see also supra note 23.  By
resisting this change, the Restatement maintained the well-reasoned difference-in-kind injury
requirement.  Schwartz & Goldberg, supra note 1, at 548.  For additional information regarding
environmentalists attempts to expand the tort of public nuisance, see Antolini, supra note 15.
45. See Antolini, supra note 15, at 819-843, 849.
46. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821C(2)(c).
47. See Antolini, supra note 15, at 856.
48. See 97 Cal. Rptr. 639, 641, 646 (Ct. App. 1971) (seeking an injunction against 293
named corporations and municipalities, as well as 1000 unnamed defendants, for air pollution).
powerful tool for overcoming traditional tort law concepts.43  Reformists also
appreciated that the same, or a similar, result could be reached by giving
private citizens greater standing to sue, as is true of most torts.44  For example,
removing the element of breach from negligence actions or defect from
products liability actions would greatly expand the applicability of those torts.
But because public nuisance was a less understood cause of action, it was seen
as a better target for this type of fundamental change.45
The final version of the Restatement (Second) evidences that the
environmental advocates achieved some victories to this end, including
granting standing to individuals to sue as “a representative of the general
public” in certain circumstances.46  Although fully presented, none of these
specific changes were included in the black letter of the Restatement (Second).
The comments to the Restatement (Second), though, do discuss both the
traditional applications of public nuisance theory as well as many of these
alternatives.  But few, if any, of their reforms have worked their way into
American jurisprudence.47  In Diamond v. General Motors Corporation, for
example, a California court of appeal rejected a public nuisance suit brought
by private plaintiffs against scores of companies for allegedly contributing to
air pollution in Los Angeles, California.48  Despite this loss, the plaintiffs’
activism planted the seeds for the public nuisance actions that are the focus of
this Article.
The asbestos litigation of the 1980s and 1990s marked the first
nonenvironmental attempt to apply public nuisance law to claims against
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2010
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49. Faulk & Gray, supra note 17, at 957.
50. Id.
51. See id. at 957-58.
52. Detroit Bd. of Educ. v. Celotex Corp., 493 N.W.2d 513, 521 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992). 
53. Tioga Pub. Sch. Dist. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 984 F.2d 915, 921 (8th Cir. 1993). 
54. See Lauren E. Handler & Charles E. Erway III, Tort of Public Nuisance in Public Entity
Litigation: Return to the Jungle?, 69 DEF. COUNS. J. 484 (2002).
55. See id. at 487; Schwartz & Goldberg, supra note 1, at 554.  For a discussion of the rise
of lucrative arrangements between state governments and contingency-fee attorneys, see
Schwartz et al., supra note 31, at 931-35.
56. See Handler & Erway, supra note 54, at 487.
57. See Susan Beck, The Lobbying Blitz over Tobacco Fees: Lawyers Went All Out in
Pursuit of Their Cut of a Historic Settlement.  And the Arbitrators Went Along, LEGAL TIMES,
Jan. 6, 2003, at 1, available at 2003 WLNR 18323549.
58. 14 F. Supp. 2d 956, 973-74 (E.D. Tex. 1997). 
59. Id. at 973.
product manufacturers.49  In these suits, schools and municipalities sought to
recover the cost of asbestos abatement and alleged that asbestos as a product
constituted the public nuisance.50  This represented a departure from previous
theories where only unreasonable conduct could result in public nuisance
liability.51  Courts resoundingly rejected this novel approach, holding, for
example, “that manufacturers, sellers, or installers of defective products may
not be held liable on a nuisance theory for injuries caused by the [product]
defect.”52  These courts understood that if the product itself were deemed a
public nuisance, then manufacturing the product “would give rise to a cause
of action . . . regardless of the defendant’s degree of culpability or of the
availability of other traditional tort law theories of recovery.”53
The effort to expand public nuisance theory to product manufacturers
gained some momentum with the tobacco litigation of the 1990s.54  State
attorneys general, working through contingency-fee attorneys, sued tobacco
manufacturers seeking billions of dollars in reimbursements for state Medicaid
and other health-program expenditures.55  One of the myriad legal claims
asserted was that the tobacco companies created a public nuisance by selling
cigarettes.56  The tobacco suits culminated with the 1998 Master Settlement
Agreement, under which the defendant manufacturers transferred $246 billion
to the states and the states’ contingency-fee attorneys.57  The only ruling on the
public nuisance theory in the tobacco litigation, however, was Texas v.
American Tobacco Co., in which the court dismissed the claim as being
outside the realm of public nuisance law.58  The court stated that it was
“unwilling to accept the state’s invitation to expand a claim for public
nuisance.”59  Even though public nuisance theory was not validated in single
tobacco case, the plaintiffs’ victory in achieving a mass settlement in litigation
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol62/iss4/1
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60. See, e.g., Ganim v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 780 A.2d 98 (Conn. 2001); City of Gary
ex rel. King v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 801 N.E.2d 1222 (Ind. 2003); City of St. Louis v.
Benjamin Moore & Co., 226 S.W.3d 110 (Mo. 2007); see also Michael DeBow, The State
Tobacco Litigation and the Separation of Powers in State Governments: Repairing the Damage,
31 SETON HALL L. REV. 563, 564-65 (2001); Handler & Erway, supra note 54, at 487-90.
61. Handler & Erway, supra note 54, at 484.
62. See Howard M. Erichson, Private Lawyers, Public Lawsuits: Plaintiffs’ Attorneys in
Municipal Gun Litigation, in SUING THE GUN INDUSTRY: A BATTLE AT THE CROSSROADS OF
GUN CONTROL AND MASS TORTS 129, 130 (Timothy D. Lytton ed., 2005); Rick Rabin, The
Rhode Island Lead Paint Lawsuit: Where Do We Go From Here?, 16 NEW SOLUTIONS 353, 356
(2006), available at http://www.nycosh.org/workplace_hazards/Chemical/RI_LeadpaintLaw
suit.pdf.
63. See, e.g., State v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, 951 A.2d 428, 443 (R.I. 2008). 
64. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 821 N.E.2d 1099, 1107 (Ill. 2004);
see also David Kairys, The Origin and Development of the Governmental Handgun Cases, 32
CONN. L. REV. 1163, 1172-73 (2000).
that included this novel theory gave it the hint of legitimacy the trial bar
needed.
Using momentum from the tobacco settlement, plaintiffs next brought
public nuisance claims against the manufacturers of guns and lead paint.60 
Just as with the asbestos and tobacco cases, the claims involved in this next
round of cases again stemmed from failed attempts to hold the manufacturers
liable under traditional tort theories, namely, products liability and
negligence.61  The contingency-fee lawyers funded many of the gun and lead
paint cases and used the various suits as research and development tools.62  The
theory of what actually constituted the public nuisance—and why the named
defendants should be subject to liability therefor—varied from case to case.
Sometimes, the product itself was the alleged nuisance.63  Other times,
plaintiffs claimed that the defendants’ marketing, sales, and distribution
practices created the nuisance.64  Regardless, the gun and lead paint
manufacturers refused to settle, and since our last article, the appeals process
has run its course in several high profile cases.  The result: a report card
showing that yet again the effort to expand the tort of public nuisance law
beyond its original scope and purpose—this time as a end-run around products
liability and negligence principles—failed.
II. Recent Attempts to Expand Public Nuisance Have Failed
Four state high courts—Illinois, Missouri, New Jersey, and Rhode
Island—flatly rejected the application of public nuisance law to actions against
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65. See Chicago v. Beretta, 821 N.E.2d 1099; Benjamin Moore, 226 S.W.3d 110 (Mo.
2007); In re Lead Paint Litig., 924 A.2d 484 (N.J. 2007); State v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, 951 A.2d
428 (R.I. 2008); see also discussion infra Part II.A-D. 
66. See City of Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 95 Ohio St.3d 416, 2002-Ohio-2480,
768 N.E.2d 1136, superseded by statute, 2006 Ohio Laws File 198 (amending OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2307.71(A)(13) (LexisNexis 2005)), as recognized in City of Toledo v. Sherwin-
Williams Co., No. CI 200606040, 2007 WL 4965044 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Dec. 12, 2007); see
also discussion infra Part II.E. 
67. See City of Milwaukee v. NL Indus., Inc., 2005 WI App 7, 278 Wis.2d 313, 691
N.W.2d 888; see also discussion infra Part II.E.
68. See Faulk & Gray, supra note 17, at 958-59. 
69. See, e.g., Ganim v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 780 A.2d 98, 115 (Conn. 2001) (“The
plaintiffs alleged that the existence of the nuisance is a proximate cause of injuries and damages
suffered by Bridgeport[, CT], namely, that the presence of illegal guns in the city causes costs
of enforcing the law, arming the police force, treating the victims of handgun crimes,
implementing social service programs, and improving the social and economic climate of
Bridgeport.”); City of Gary ex rel. King v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 801 N.E.2d 1222, 1231 (Ind.
2003) (“The City allege[d] that the manufacturers, distributors, and dealers knowingly
participate in a distribution system that unnecessarily and sometimes even intentionally provides
guns to criminals, juveniles, and others who may not lawfully purchase them.”); Cincinnati v.
Beretta, ¶ 7, 768 N.E.2d at 1141 (stating that the City alleged that the defendants “know, or
reasonably should know, that their conduct will cause handguns to be used and possessed
illegally and that such conduct produces an ongoing nuisance that has a detrimental effect upon
the public health, safety, and welfare of the residents”).
product manufacturers.65  Additionally, the Supreme Court of Ohio’s
acceptance of this theory was short-lived, as the state’s general assembly
wasted no time before legislatively overturning the court’s decision.66  A
Wisconsin jury even appreciated the limits of the cause of action when it
returned a verdict for the defendant manufacturer before the case could be
appealed to the state’s high court.67  Notably, plaintiffs’ lawyers chose to file
suits in the above states, believing that these jurisdictions provided
opportunities for success with this approach.  Repudiation of the plaintiffs’
proposed application of public nuisance theory by these courts, then, carries
special import. 
A. Illinois: City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp.
In the late 1990s, several cities and counties filed suits against gun
manufacturers seeking reimbursement for law-enforcement and public-health
expenses incurred as a result of gun violence.68  Plaintiffs argued that gun
manufacturers, through marketing, sales, and distribution practices, facilitated
the illegal secondary gun market and interfered with the public health and
safety, thereby creating a public nuisance.69  Both state and federal courts—at
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70. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 277 F.3d 415, 420-22 (3d Cir.
2002) (applying Pennsylvania law); Camden County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders v. Beretta
U.S.A. Corp., 273 F.3d 536, 539-42 (3d Cir. 2001) (applying New Jersey law); Ganim, 780
A.2d at 131-33; Penelas v. Arms Tech., Inc., 778 So. 2d 1042, 1045 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001);
Chicago v. Beretta, 821 N.E.2d at 1148; People ex rel. Spitzer v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 761
N.Y.S.2d 192, 203-04 (App. Div. 2003).  But see Gary ex rel. King, 801 N.E.2d at 1232-34
(allowing a public nuisance claim to proceed); Cincinnati v. Beretta, 768 N.E.2d at 1150-51
(same); see also City of Boston v. Smith & Wesson Corp., No. 199902590, 2000 WL 1473568,
at *14 (Mass. Super. Ct. July 13, 2000) (“To be sure, the legal theory is unique in the
Commonwealth but . . . that is not reason to dismiss at this stage of the proceedings.”).
71. See Chicago v. Beretta, 821 N.E.2d 1099.
72. See id. at 1105-06.  The county government of Cook County joined the city government
as a plaintiff in the suit.  See id. at 1105. 
73. Id. at 1108. 
74. Id. at 1109.
75. See id. at 1147-48.
76. See id. at 1113, 1148. 
77. Id. at 1116. 
78. Id. 
the trial and appellate levels—rejected this theory,70 but the Supreme Court of
Illinois was the first state court of last resort to do so.71
The Illinois litigation began when the City of Chicago brought a lawsuit
sounding in public nuisance against the manufacturers, distributors, and
dealers of firearms.72  The suit alleged that “the residents of Chicago have a
common right to be free from conduct that creates an unreasonable jeopardy
to the public’s health, welfare and safety.”73  The City further alleged that the
defendants “intentionally and recklessly” designed, marketed, and distributed
their products in such a way that they knew or should have known that their
products would be taken into Chicago and create an ongoing public nuisance.74
In a comprehensive, fifty-page opinion, the Illinois Supreme Court drew from
the historical nature of public nuisance theory in concluding that the City
failed to state a valid public nuisance claim.75  The court focused on the core
elements of the tort: public right, unreasonable conduct, proximate causation,
and control.76
The court first held that the plaintiffs were not asserting a public right,
stating that there is no “public right to be free from the threat that some
individuals may use an otherwise legal product . . . in a manner that may create
a risk of harm to another.”77  A contrary interpretation would have created a
“right so broad and undefined that the presence of any potentially dangerous
instrumentality in the community could be deemed to threaten it.”78  To
support its reasoning, the court provided examples of cell phones, DVD
players, and other lawful products that may be misused by drivers to create a
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79. Id.
80. Id.  The court continued, “Further, because we conclude . . . that plaintiffs’ claim does
not meet all of the required elements of a public nuisance action, we need not decide whether
to break new ground by creating such precedent.”  Id. 
81. See id. at 1109, 1117.
82. Id.  The court rejected the argument that the defendants were shielded from liability
under public nuisance law solely because they complied with existing regulatory schemes.  See
id. at 1121-22.  The court noted that a public nuisance may result from “conducting a lawful
enterprise in an unreasonable manner.”  Id. at 1124.   
83. Id. at 1117.  
84. See id. 
85. Id. at 1121.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1132.
88. See id. at 1133.
risk of harm to others.79  The court then rejected the plaintiffs’ attempt to
extend public nuisance theory to encompass such products, concluding “that
there [was] no authority for the unprecedented expansion of the concept of
public rights to encompass the right asserted by the plaintiffs.”80
Second, the court held that the defendants’ allegedly wrongful actions were
not the type of “unreasonable conduct” that results in public nuisance liability
in Illinois.81  According to the City, the defendants acted unreasonably by
designing, marketing, and distributing firearms despite knowledge that the
products would end up in Chicago and create higher levels of crime, death,
fear, and discomfort.82  The court explained that Illinois courts have only
acknowledged two circumstances under which a public nuisance may arise:
when “the defendant’s conduct in creating the public nuisance involved the
defendant’s use of land, or [when] the conduct at issue was in violation of a
statute or ordinance.”83  The court concluded that “the effect of lawful conduct
that does not involve the use of land” does not satisfy the conduct requirement
of the tort of public nuisance.84  Ruling otherwise would improperly invade the
right of the state legislature to regulate “the manufacture, distribution, and sale
of firearms.”85  Indeed, the court recognized that the City was seeking
“injunctive relief from th[e] court because relief ha[d] not been forthcoming
from the General Assembly.”86
Finally, the court analyzed the elements of causation and control
collectively, finding that the issue of control could be viewed as a “factor in
both the proximate cause inquiry and in the ability of the court to fashion
appropriate injunctive relief.”87  As with all torts, proximate cause in public
nuisance actions is a question of foreseeability and public policy—a party may
only be held liable for injuries a reasonable person would foresee as a
consequence of his or her actions.88  Here, the court found that the defendants’
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89. Id. at 1134.
90. Id. (quoting Merlo v. Pub. Serv. Co of N. Ill., 45 N.E.2d 665, 675 (1942)). 
91. Id. at 1136 (quoting People ex rel. Spitzer v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 761 N.Y.S.2d 192,
201 (App. Div. 2003)).  
92. Id. at 1148. 
93. See 226 S.W.3d 110 (Mo. 2007).
94. See generally Martha R. Mahoney, Four Million Children at Risk: Lead Paint
Poisoning Victims and the Law, 9 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 46 (1990). 
95. See id. at 58.
96. See id. at 58-60.
97. See id. at 60.
conduct was not the proximate cause of the alleged injury because “criminal
acts of third parties ha[d] broken the causal connection.”89  The court
continued that even the observance of “reasonable diligence” would not have
prevented the harm because the third parties were “not under the control of the
one guilty of the original wrong.”90  Quoting the Appellate Division of the
Supreme Court of New York, the Illinois Supreme Court stated,
“[D]efendants’ lawful commercial activity, having been followed by harm to
person and property caused directly and principally by the criminal activity of
intervening third parties, may not be considered a proximate cause of such
harm.”91
The court concluded that the significant expansion of tort duties that the
plaintiffs sought was of such a magnitude that it “must be the work of the
legislature, brought about by the political process, not the work of the
courts.”92  
B. Missouri: City of St. Louis v. Benjamin Moore & Co.
In City of St. Louis v. Benjamin Moore & Co., the Missouri Supreme Court
became the first state supreme court to address the application of public
nuisance law to the manufacturers of lead paint and pigment.93  The litigation
involving lead paint stemmed from injuries to children that were allegedly
caused by their ingestion of lead particles from flaking and deteriorating
paint.94  Lawsuits for this type of injury began in the 1960s and were then
properly being filed against the individual landowners who failed to
adequately maintain their properties.95  The claims largely succeeded, serving
the dual role of providing an avenue for recovery for those injured from the
negligent maintenance and incentivizing landowners to adequately maintain
their properties.96  In the 1980s, however, plaintiffs’ attorneys switched their
focus from individual landowners to the “deep-pocketed” lead paint and
pigment manufacturers, asserting strict products liability and negligence
claims.97  The suits sounding in products liability were uniformly unsuccessful,
as plaintiffs failed to establish the fundamental elements of defective design
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98. See Scott A. Smith, Turning Lead into Asbestos and Tobacco: Litigation Alchemy Gone
Wrong, 71 DEF. COUNS. J. 119, 124 (2004); see also Santiago v. Sherwin Williams Co., 3 F.3d
546, 547 (1st Cir. 1993) (“Plaintiff could not and cannot identify . . . which, if any, of the
defendants are the source of the lead she ingested . . . .”); Sabater ex rel. Santana v. Lead Indus.
Ass’n, 704 N.Y.S.2d 800, 805 (Sup. Ct. 2000) (“[T]here is no duty upon a manufacturer to
refrain from the lawful distribution of a non-defective product.”).
99. See, e.g., United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979) (noting that time-barring
restrictions reflect “a pervasive legislative judgment that . . . ‘the right to be free from stale
claims in time comes to prevail over’” other considerations (quoting R.R. Telegraphers v. Ry.
Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 349 (1944)); City of Philadelphia v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, 994
F.2d 112, 121-22 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that claims asserted in 1990 accrued in 1976 when
Congress ordered the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development to begin eliminating
lead paint from federally funded housing, thereby putting claimants on notice that lead paint
was a health hazard); City of New York v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, No. 14365/89, 1991 WL 284454,
at *2-3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 23, 1991) (explaining that the statute of limitations does not restart
because of new damages), aff’d, 597 N.Y.S.2d 698 (App. Div. 1993). 
100. See 226 S.W.3d 110, 114 (Mo. 2007).
101. See id. at 113.
102. Id.  
103. See id. at 113, 116.
104. Id. at 113.  
105. See id.
and proximate causation.98  Furthermore, even if the plaintiffs could have
alleged valid product liability claims, the statutes of limitations for the actions
had long expired.99
In an effort to circumvent the traditional elements and defenses of products
liability law that proved to be obstacles to their theories (e.g., product
identification), plaintiffs recast their claims as public nuisance suits.  In City
of St. Louis v. Benjamin Moore & Co., for example, the City argued that it did
not have to prove specific causation by identifying the particular
manufacturers whose paint actually caused the alleged public nuisance.100
From abatement records, the City could identify the individual homes from
which lead paint had been removed, but could not trace the paint to any
specific defendant.101  The City contended that, as a practical matter, it should
not have to identify the actual manufacturer of the paint that was removed
from the properties to prove causation.102  The City believed that product
identification should not be required in public nuisance suits with
governmental plaintiffs, particularly given the cumulative and widespread
nature of the defendants’ activity.103  According to the City, it should instead
only be required “to show that the defendants substantially contributed to the
lead paint problem in the city”104 and then that the court should divide the
damages among the defendants in proportion to each’s share of the lead paint
market.105
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106. Courts have similarly rejected such attempts to expand public nuisance liability in
asbestos and other lead paint cases.  See, e.g., Tioga Pub. Sch. Dist. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 984
F.2d 915, 921 (8th Cir. 1993) (explaining that the new public nuisance theory would “give rise
to a cause of action . . . regardless of the defendant’s degree of culpability or of the availability
of other traditional tort law theories of recovery”); City of Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp.,
No. A9902369, 1999 WL 809838, at *2 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Oct. 7, 1999) (“A separate body of
law (strict product liability and negligence) has been developed to cover the design and
manufacture of products.  To permit public nuisance law to be applied to the design and
manufacture of lawful products would be to destroy the separate tort principles which govern
those activities.”), rev’d, 768 N.E.2d 1136 (2002).
107. Benjamin Moore, 226 S.W.3d at 115. 
108. Id. at 116.
109. Id. at 115-16 (emphasis added).
110. Id. at 115 (quoting Zafft v. Eli Lilly & Co., 676 S.W.2d 241, 246 (Mo. 1984)). 
111. Brief of Amici Curiae Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America &
American Tort Reform Ass’n at 11-18, Benjamin Moore, 226 S.W.3d 110 (No. SC88230), 2007
WL 833838, at *11-18.
112. See Schwartz et al., supra note 1, at 558 n.5.
The Missouri Supreme Court swiftly rejected the City’s theory.106  Instead,
the court held to the traditional legal principle that in all tort claims, the
plaintiff must prove that the defendant’s conduct was the actual cause of the
injury, which “can be established only by identifying the defendant who made
or sold that product.”107  The court specifically rejected the City’s argument
that its status as a governmental entity and the uniquely public nature of the
alleged injury necessitated a departure from traditional causation standards.108
The court explained that “[w]ithout product identification, the city can do no
more than show that the defendants’ lead paint may have been present in the
properties where the city claims to have incurred abatement costs.”109  
With regard to the division of damages in accordance with the defendants’
market share, the court referenced previous rejections of other market-share-
based theories as being “unfair, unworkable, and contrary to Missouri law, as
well as unsound public policy.”110  As the authors pointed out in an amicus
brief to the Missouri Supreme Court, market-share theory, even in the half-
dozen states where it has been accepted, was inapplicable in this situation
because it was never intended to create industry-wide liability.111  Rather, the
sole purpose of market-share theory has been to reverse the burden of proof in
a very narrow set of circumstances where each defendant is presumed to be in
a better position to know the course of harm and to exonerate itself or to join
culpable parties to the action.112  With regard to deteriorated lead in residences,
the paint manufacturer is not best situated to identify or alter the course of
harm.  Rather, property owners that caused the hazardous condition through
neglect are best positioned to prevent any resulting injuries.  
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113. Benjamin Moore, 226 S.W.3d at 116-17. 
114. Id. at 116.
115. See In re Lead Paint Litig., 924 A.2d 484, 486-87 (N.J. 2007).
116. Id. at 487; In re Lead Paint, No. MID-L-2754-01, 2002 WL 31474528 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. Nov. 4, 2002). 
117. See Lead Paint, 2002 WL 31474528, at *23.
118. In re Lead Paint Litig., 924 A.2d at 488-89, 506. 
119. Id. at 494. 
120. See id. at 502-03; see also Steven P. Benenson & Borden R. Gillis, Analysis of the New
Jersey Supreme Court in “In re Lead Paint Litigation,” http://www.nuisancelaw.com/print/131
(last visited Aug. 10, 2010). 
121. In re Lead Paint Litig., 924 A.2d at 494. 
Finally, the court rejected the City’s claim because the remedy sought was
not abatement, but money damages for expenses incurred from assessing,
abating, and remediating lead paint in private residences.113  The court
correctly pointed out that money damages are only appropriate in public
nuisance actions brought by private individuals for particularized harms that
result from encountering a public nuisance.114
C. New Jersey: In re Lead Paint Litigation
The New Jersey lead paint litigation began in 2001 when the City of
Newark filed suit against former manufacturers of lead paint and pigment for
the costs of assessing and abating lead paint from residences and buildings,
providing medical care to those with lead poisoning, and educating the public
on the hazards of lead paint.115  Twenty-five counties and municipalities soon
filed similar lawsuits, and in February 2002, all twenty-six cases were
consolidated and assigned to Supervising Mass Tort Judge Marina Corodemus
in the Mass Tort Section of Middlesex County.116  Judge Corodemus granted
the defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim in November
2002,117 and after a court of appeals reinstated the public nuisance claim, the
New Jersey Supreme Court dismissed the suit.118 
Considering lead paint and pigment suits in the context of public nuisance
law, the New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that the “plaintiffs’ loosely-
articulated assertions here [could not] find their basis in this tort.”119  The court
looked specifically to the relief sought by the plaintiffs and the conduct of the
manufacturers and, like the high courts of Illinois and Missouri, refused to
recognize a cause of action under public nuisance for damages resulting from
the ordinary use of lawful products.120  The court stated that accepting the
plaintiffs’ claims “would stretch the concept of public nuisance far beyond
recognition and would create a new and entirely unbounded tort antithetical to
the meaning and inherent theoretical limitations of the tort of public
nuisance.”121
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol62/iss4/1
2010]   THE ATTEMPTED EXPANSION OF PUBLIC NUISANCE LAW 647
122. Id.
123. See id. at 498-99.
124. See id. at 498.
125. Id. at 498-99 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821(C)(1) (1979)). 
126. See id. at 499. 
127. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 24:14A-1 to :14A-11 (West 1997 & Supp. 2010).  
128. See In re Lead Paint Litig., 924 A.2d at 501 (“In examining the Lead Paint Act and its
relationship to public nuisance generally, we find its focus on premises owners as the relevant
actors to be instructive.”).  
129. Id.
130. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821(B)(2)(a)) . 
131. Id.
132. Id. at 502.
As the court explained, the claims fell far outside the traditional bounds of
public nuisance theory, as the tort is defined by “clear and consistent
parameters.”122  The court initially focused on the traditional limitation that
monetary damages are not available in suits brought by public entities.123  Yet
again, the court properly recognized that public nuisance law permits monetary
damages only in actions by private plaintiffs.124  “[T]here is no right either
historically, or through the Restatement (Second)’s formulation, for the public
entity to seek to collect money damages in general.”125  The court recognized
the “time-honored” element of public nuisance law that “a public entity which
proceeds against the one in control of the nuisance may only seek to abate, at
the expense of the one in control of the nuisance.”126
In addition, the court reasoned, the defendants did not engage in
unreasonable conduct.  Rather, the court emphasized that the state’s Lead Paint
Act127 placed the responsibility for abatement on the individual property
owners.128  Because lead paint is hazardous only when deteriorating or flaking,
“the Legislature, consistent with traditional public nuisance concepts,
recognized that the appropriate target of the abatement and enforcement
scheme must be the premises owner whose conduct has, effectively, created
the nuisance.”129  Thus, the premises owners, not the manufacturers, “engaged
in the ‘conduct [that] involve[d] a significant interference with the public
health.’”130  To conclude otherwise “would separate conduct and location and
thus eliminate entirely the concept of control of the nuisance.”131  The court
concluded that merely distributing lead paint was not sufficiently linked to the
health crises alleged and, therefore, “the claims of plaintiffs [could not] sound
in public nuisance.”132
The court further exposed the lawsuits as products liability claims
masquerading under the guise of public nuisance: 
Our analysis of both traditional and modern concepts of the tort of
public nuisance demonstrates that plaintiffs’ complaints cannot be
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2010
648 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  62:629
133. Id. at 503. 
134. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-1 to :58C-11 (West 2000 & Supp. 2010).
135. In re Lead Paint Litig., 924 A.2d at 503 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-1(b)(3)
(defining “product liability action”)). 
136. Id. (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-2). 
137. Id. at 505 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Camden County Bd. of Chosen
Freeholders v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 273 F.3d 536, 540 (3d Cir. 2001)).
138. Id. at 502. 
139. Id. at 501.
140. See Michael Freedman, Turning Lead into Gold, FORBES, May 14, 2001, at 122, 125,
available at 2001 WLNR 12246271; see also Joe Nocera, The Pursuit of Justice, or Money,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2007, at C1.  “The state alleged that the manufacturers or their
predecessors-in-interest had manufactured, promoted, distributed, and sold lead pigment for use
in residential paint, despite that they knew or should have known, since the early 1900s, that
lead is hazardous to human health.”  State v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, 951 A.2d 428, 440 (R.I. 2008).
understood to state such a claim.  Equally supportive of that
conclusion, however, is the inescapable fact that carefully read, the
claims asserted would instead be cognizable only as products
liability claims.133
The New Jersey Product Liability Act134 (PLA), the court continued,
“encompass[es] virtually all possible causes of action relating to harms caused
by consumer and other products,” including the defendants’ products and the
harms they allegedly caused.135  The assertion that the defendants failed to
warn of the dangers associated with lead paint represented a “classic
articulation of tort law duties, that is, to warn of or to make safe, [and was]
squarely within those theories included in the PLA.”136  
Finally, the court agreed with previous case law that “were [it] to find a
cause of action here, nuisance law would become a monster that would devour
in one gulp the entire law of tort.”137  Allowing plaintiffs to proceed would
“creat[e] strict liability to be imposed on manufacturers of ordinary consumer
products which, although legal when sold, . . . have become dangerous through
deterioration and poor maintenance by the purchasers.”138  Thus, “merely
offering an everyday household product for sale [would] suffice for the
purpose of interfering with a common right,” creating potential liability that
“would far exceed any cognizable cause of action,” public nuisance or
otherwise.139
D. Rhode Island: State v. Lead Industries Ass’n
The Rhode Island lead paint litigation began in 1999 when the plaintiffs’
firm of Motley Rice solicited then Rhode Island Attorney General Sheldon
Whitehouse to enter into a contingency-fee agreement to pursue former lead
paint manufacturers for billions of dollars in damages.140  Mr. Motley boasted
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The complaint also alleged that the manufacturers failed to warn Rhode Islanders of the hazards
associated with lead, failed to adequately test lead pigment, concealed the hazards from the
public or misrepresented that they were safe, and that as a result of these actions, the State
incurred substantial costs.  Id.  
141. Mark Curriden, Tobacco Fees Give Plaintiffs’ Lawyers New Muscle for Other
Litigation, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 31, 1999, at 1H, 5H, available at 1999 WLNR
6296780; see also Freedman, supra note 140, at 122-23 (explaining that Mr. Motley targeted
the former lead companies as his “next big-game hunt,” found victims, and “demonized” the
industry because it was a “fat target”).
142. See 951 A.2d 428.
143. See id. at 434.
144. See id.  
145. See Companies in Lead-Paint Case Won’t Pay Punitive Damages, USATODAY.COM,
Feb. 28, 2006, http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/manufacturing/2006-02-28-lead-
paint-wire_x.htm; Raja Mishra, Rhode Island Wins Lead Paint Suit, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 23,
2006, at B2, available at 2006 WLNR 3133915.
146. See Lead Indus. Ass’n, 951 A.2d at 435-36.
147. Id. at 435.
148. See id. at 446.
149. See id. at 435-36.
[D]efendants were not in control of any lead pigment at the time the lead caused
harm to children in Rhode Island, making defendants unable to abate the alleged
nuisance, the standard remedy in a public nuisance action.  Furthermore, the
at the time that he would “bring the entire lead paint industry to its knees.”141
Despite being filed later in time, the New Jersey and Missouri cases were the
first to come to a final adjudication and, in some ways, served as a warm-up
act of sorts for State v. Lead Industries Ass’n142—the most watched effort to
expand public nuisance law to cover product manufacturing: it was the first
statewide lead paint nuisance action filed by a state attorney general,143 the trial
had ended in a plaintiff’s verdict,144 and numerous public attorneys and Wall
Street interests were watching closely to see if the new theory would be
sustained.145 
The Supreme Court of Rhode Island categorically rejected the public
nuisance claim, holding that the trial judge erred in denying defendants’
motion to dismiss.146  According to the court, the nature and elements of public
nuisance law did not support this kind of action: “[H]owever grave the
problem of lead poisoning is in Rhode Island, public nuisance law simply does
not provide a remedy for this harm.  The state has not and cannot allege facts
that would fall within the parameters of what would constitute public nuisance
under Rhode Island law.”147  The court reiterated the four historical elements
required to maintain a claim for public nuisance—public right, unreasonable
conduct, control, and proximate causation.148  In its ruling, the court focused
on the elements of public right and control in holding that nothing in the
complaint could support any of these elements.149
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General Assembly has recognized the defendants’ lack of control and inability to
abate the alleged nuisance because it has placed the burden on landlords and
property owners to make their properties lead safe.
Id. 
150. See id. at 453-55.  The court noted that “[a]bsent from the state’s complaint is any
allegation that defendants have interfered with a public right as that term long has been
understood in the law of public nuisance.”  Id. at 453.
151. Id. at 453 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 821B cmt. g (1979)). 
152. Id.
153. Id. at 448 (alteration in original) (quoting Gifford, supra note 18, at 817).
154. Id. at 453 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 821B cmt. g).  Earlier in the
opinion, the court explained that “[a]s the Restatement (Second) makes clear, a public right is
more than an aggregate of private rights by a large number of injured people.  Rather, a public
right is the right to a public good, such as ‘an indivisible resource shared by the public at large,
like air, water, or public rights of way.’”  Id. at 448 (citation omitted) (quoting City of Chicago
v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 823 N.E.2d 126, 131 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005)). 
155. Id. at 448 (quoting Gifford, supra note 18, at 817). 
156. Id. at 453.
157. See id. at 455.  (“We conclude, therefore, that there was no set of facts alleged in the
state’s complaint that, even if proven, could have demonstrated that defendants’ conduct,
however unreasonable, interfered with a public right or that defendants had control over the
product causing the alleged nuisance at the time children were injured.  Accordingly, we need
not decide whether defendants’ conduct was unreasonable or whether defendants caused an
injury to children in Rhode Island.”). 
158. Id. at 449.
First, the court found that the plaintiffs failed to sufficiently allege that the
defendants infringed on any public right.150  The court explained that “[t]he
interference must deprive all members of the community of a right to some
resource to which they otherwise are entitled.”151  The “right to be free from
the hazards of unabated lead” is not a public right.152  In fact, as the court
concluded, “[t]he manufacture and distribution of products rarely, if ever,
causes a violation of a public right.”153  The court further clarified that the
cumulative effect of private claims does not create “a public nuisance merely
because it interferes with the use and enjoyment of land by a large number of
persons.”154  “The sheer number of violations does not transform the harm
from individual injury to communal injury.”155  An opposite interpretation
“would be antithetical to the common law and would lead to a widespread
expansion of public nuisance law that was never intended.”156
 The court also found that the plaintiffs’ allegations did not demonstrate
control of the lead paint by the former lead paint and pigment manufacturers
at the time the injuries occurred, as required under longstanding Rhode Island
law.157  Yet “control at the time the damage occurs is critical in public nuisance
cases, especially because the principal remedy for the harm caused by the
nuisance is abatement.”158  This remedial limitation is premised on the
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159. Id.  The court discussed the New Jersey Supreme Court’s ruling in In re Lead Paint
Litigation, 924 A.2d 484 (N.J. 2007), which similarly held that manufacturers of lead pigment
could not be held liable for public nuisance under New Jersey law.  See Lead Indus. Ass’n, 951
A.2d at 449.  The Rhode Island court paraphrased the New Jersey court’s holding “that control
at the time the damage occurs is a time-honored element of public nuisance.”  Id. (citing In re
Lead Paint Litig., 924 A.2d at 499); see also supra text accompanying note 126.
160. See 2002 R.I. Pub. Laws 875, 879 (codified as amended at R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-128.1-
8 (2006)). 
161. Lead Indus. Ass’n, 951 A.2d at 456.
162. See R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 23-24.6-23, 23-24.6-27 (2006).
163. See R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 42-128.1-10. 
164. Lead Indus. Ass’n, 951 A.2d at 456.
165. Id. (citing City of Chicago v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 823 N.E.2d 126, 134 (Ill. App. Ct.
2005); City of St. Louis v. Benjamin Moore & Co., 226 S.W.3d 110, 116 (Mo. 2007); In re
Lead Paint Litig., 924 A.2d 484, 503-05 (N.J. 2007)). 
166. Id. at 457.
167. Columbus Drops Nuisance Suit over Lead Paint, DAYTON BUS. J., July 10, 2008,
rationale that “[t]he party in control of the instrumentality causing the alleged
nuisance is best positioned to abate it and, therefore, is legally responsible.”159
The lead paint defendants, like most manufacturers, relinquished control of the
product at the time it was sold to consumers or distributors.  As recognized by
the Rhode Island Lead Hazard Mitigation Act, property owners exercised
control of the lead-containing materials and, therefore, were in the best
position to abate the nuisance.160  Importantly, the court explained that its
ruling did “not leave Rhode Islanders without a remedy.”161  Rather, plaintiffs
could continue to seek injunctions, penalties, and fines against individual
landlords under the Lead Poisoning Prevention Act162 or the Lead Hazard
Mitigation Act.163
The court further explained that any suit against product manufacturers “for
the sale of an unsafe product is a products liability action,” and that “public
nuisance and products liability are two distinct causes of action, each with
rational boundaries that are not intended to overlap.”164  Citing to the New
Jersey and Missouri Supreme Court decisions, the court continued, “Courts in
other states consistently have rejected product-based public nuisance suits
against lead pigment manufacturers, expressing a concern that allowing such
a lawsuit would circumvent the basic requirements of products liability
law.”165  The court went on to conclude that “these cases [cumulatively]
demonstrate that even if a lawsuit is characterized as a public nuisance cause
of action, the suit nonetheless sounds in products liability if it is against a
manufacturer based on harm caused by its products.”166
Less than two weeks after the Rhode Island ruling, the City of Columbus
voluntarily dismissed its public nuisance suit against lead paint
manufacturers,167 becoming the tenth Ohio city to voluntarily dismiss such a
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http://dayton.bizjournals.com/dayton/stories/2008/07/07/daily30.html; Mark Ferenchik, City
Drops Lead-Paint Suit: Court Rulings Elsewhere Lead to Decision; Ohio Will Pursue Its Case,
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, July 10, 2008, at 1B, available at 2008 WLNR 12918860; Paintmakers
Win Public Nuisance Appeal; Columbus Drops its Suit, CHEMICAL WK., July 14, 2008, at 4,
available at 2008 WLNR 13476765. 
168. John O’Brien, Another Paint Suit Brushed Away, LEGALNEWSLINE.COM, July 9, 2008,
http://www.legalnewsline.com/news/214039-another-paint-suit-brushed-away. 
169. Press Release, Ohio Attorney Gen. Richard Cordray, Cordray Dismisses Lead Paint
Lawsuit (Feb. 6, 2009), available at http://www.ohioattorneygeneral.gov/NewsReleases (follow
“February 2009" or “All News Releases” hyperlink; then follow “Cordray Dismisses Lead Paint
Lawsuit” hyperlink). 
170. Id. 
171. See Frederick C. Schaefer & Christine Nykiel, Lead Paint: Mass Tort Litigation and
Public Nuisance Trends in America, 74 DEF. COUNS. J. 153, 154 (2007). 
172. Id.; see also State v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, 951 A.2d 428, 455-56 (R.I. 2008). 
173. See State v. Schenectady Chems., Inc., 459 N.Y.S.2d 971 (Sup. Ct. 1983).
174. See id. at 976-77.
175. Id. at 977. 
suit.168  In February 2009, Ohio Attorney General Richard Cordray dismissed
Ohio’s final public nuisance suit against the lead paint manufacturers “[a]fter
assessing the law, facts, and adverse legal rulings in these types of cases
nationally.”169  Cordray said in a press release, “I understand and strongly
agree that exposure to lead paint is a very real problem . . . .  But I also know
that not every problem can be solved by a lawsuit.”170
E. Ohio and Wisconsin
The treatment of public nuisance cases in Ohio and Wisconsin is also
instructive.  Historically, efforts to expand liability using public nuisance
theory have occasionally met with success.171  A few courts have yielded to
plaintiffs’ arguments, and “[a]rmed with a sense of moral imperative, [they
have] . . . push[ed] the law to its outermost limits in order to obtain what they
believe to be an equitable result.”172
Consider, for example, a New York case over improper dumping of waste
that polluted certain grounds and waterways.173  Even though the defendant did
not control the contractor hired to dispose of the waste, nor the land where the
waste was dumped, the court allowed a public nuisance case to proceed against
the corporation that owned the waste.174  With surprising candor, the court
recognized that the decision over who should pay for the cleanup was
“essentially a political question to be decided in the legislative arena,” but
proceeded to hold that the defendant could be subject to public nuisance
liability because “[s]omeone must pay to correct the problem.”175  Whether
these kinds of ends-justifies-the-means decisions are aberrations or trendsetters
is the key issue.
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176. See City of Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 95 Ohio St.3d 416, 2002-Ohio-2480,
768 N.E.2d 1136, superseded by statute, 2006 Ohio Laws File 198 (amending OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2307.71(A)(13) (LexisNexis 2005)), as recognized in City of Toledo v. Sherwin-
Williams Co., No. CI 200606040, 2007 WL 4965044 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Dec. 12, 2007).
177. See City of Milwaukee v. NL Indus., Inc., 2005 WI App 7, ¶¶ 17-19, 278 Wis.2d 313,
¶¶ 17-19, 691 N.W.2d 888, ¶¶ 17-19.
178. See City of Milwaukee v. NL Indus., Inc., 2008 WI App 181, ¶ 17,  315 Wis.2d 443,
¶ 17, 762 N.W.2d 757, ¶ 17.
179. Cincinnati v. Beretta, ¶ 1, 768 N.E.2d at 1140.  The City also alleged negligence and
products liability.  Id.
180. Id.
181. See id. ¶ 16, 768 N.E.2d at 1143-44 (“[W]e find that [the City] has adequately pled its
public-nuisance claim and has set forth sufficient facts necessary to overcome appellees’ motion
to dismiss.”).
182. Id. ¶ 9, 768 N.E.2d at 1142.  Compare City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 821
N.E.2d 1099, 1117 (Ill. 2004) (refusing to expand conduct giving rise to public nuisance beyond
statutory violations and use of the defendant’s land), discussed supra Part II.A. 
In the most recent attempt to expand public nuisance law, the aberrant cases
were decided by the Ohio Supreme Court and the Wisconsin Court of Appeals.
The impact of these two cases, however, has been marginalized.  In Ohio, the
General Assembly immediately overturned the supreme court’s decision by
legislatively declaring that all common law public nuisance suits against
product manufacturers must be heard under the state’s products liability
laws.176  
In Wisconsin, after the court of appeals permitted the plaintiffs’ nuisance
claim to proceed despite their failure to establish causation,177 a Milwaukee
jury returned a defense verdict.178  Due to this outcome, the case was never
appealed to the Supreme Court of Wisconsin for a final ruling on the
legitimacy of the plaintiffs’ proposed expansion of public nuisance theory.
1. City of Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp.
In 1999, the City of Cincinnati brought a public nuisance suit against fifteen
gun manufacturers, three trade associations, and one gun distributor.179  The
City sought both injunctive relief and monetary damages for an alleged
increase in health-care and law-enforcement costs attributable to gun
violence.180
When the case made its way to the Ohio Supreme Court, Ohio became the
first and only state whose high court permitted a public nuisance claim to
proceed against a product manufacturer.181  Although Ohio’s public nuisance
law had only been applied to real property and statutory violations, the court
observed that it had never strictly limited public nuisance to those types of
actions.182  Instead, the court held that “under the Restatement’s broad
definition, a public-nuisance action can be maintained for injuries caused by
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183. Cincinnati v. Beretta, ¶ 10, 768 N.E.2d at 1142.
184. See, e.g., State v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, 951 A.2d 428, 457 (R.I. 2008); see also supra text
accompanying note 166.
185. Cincinnati v. Beretta, ¶ 12, 768 N.E.2d at 1143. 
186. Id. ¶ 13, 768 N.E.2d at 1143.
187. Id. ¶ 51, 768 N.E.2d at 1151.
188. See 2006 Ohio Laws File 198 (amending OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.71(A)(13)
(LexisNexis 2005)). 
a product if the facts establish that the design, manufacturing, marketing, or
sale of the product unreasonably interferes with a right common to the general
public.”183  Thus, where other courts have recognized such actions as truly
sounding in products liability,184 the Ohio Supreme Court willingly expanded
the law, or at least found a broad interpretation in order to encompass the
City’s claims.
The court also discounted the traditional public nuisance element of control,
stating that it would not be “fatal to appellant’s public nuisance claim that
appellees did not control the actual firearms at the moment that harm
occurred.”185  Unlike similarly situated courts, the Ohio Supreme Court was
satisfied with the plaintiffs’ allegations that the defendants controlled the
supply of guns that created and perpetuated the alleged public nuisance, even
if they were not in actual control of the instrumentalities: “Just as the
individuals who fire the guns are held accountable for the injuries sustained,
[the defendants] can be held liable for creating the alleged nuisance.”186
Admitting that its legal construction serviced a policy goal, the court stated,
“While no one should believe that lawsuits against gun manufacturers and
dealers will solve the multifaceted problem of firearm violence, such litigation
may have an important role to play, complementing other interventions
available to cities and states.”187  These statements illustrate that the court
relaxed the traditional elements of public nuisance law to encompass the City’s
claim and correct a perceived societal harm.  By maneuvering around
longstanding tort principles, the court momentarily breathed life back into the
expansive approach and risked creating an entirely new and unfounded cause
of action.
Almost immediately, members of the Ohio General Assembly recognized
the threat posed by the court’s ruling and introduced legislation to preclude
public nuisance claims against product manufacturers.188  Legislators
appreciated that the ruling risked venturing down the slippery slope cautioned
by courts around the nation—permitting such a suit would greatly expand the
scope of liability for all product manufacturers by allowing any claim for harm
caused by a lawfully manufactured product to be brought under a public
nuisance theory.  Representative Bill Seitz from Cincinnati perceived this
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189. Peter Krouse, Bill Could Thwart Cities’ Lawsuits on Lead Paint, CLEVELAND PLAIN
DEALER, Dec. 15, 2006, at C1 (internal quotation marks omitted), available at 2006 WLNR
21847013. 
190. Mark Ferenchik et al., Columbus Rethinking Lead-Paint Suit, COLUMBUS DISPATCH,
Dec. 1, 2006, at 1A, available at 2006 WLNR 20772528. 
191. Id.
192. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2307.71 to 2307.80. 
193. 2006 Ohio Laws File 198 (amending OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.71(A)(13)).  The
amending act, also known as Ohio Senate Bill 117, met with some opposition.  The bill passed
the General Assembly on December 14, 2006, and was sent thirteen days later to then Governor
Taft, who opted to let the bill pass into law without his signature on his last day in office,
January 5, 2007.  See State ex rel. Ohio Gen. Assem. v. Brunner, 114 Ohio St.3d 386, 2007-
Ohio-3780, 872 N.E.2d 912, ¶¶ 4-9.  The Ohio Constitution provides that a bill becomes law
if no action is taken by the governor within ten days of the bill being sent to the governor’s
office.  See  OHIO CONST. art. II, § 16.  The new governor, Ted Strickland, immediately
attempted to veto the legislation on his first day in office.  See Brunner, ¶ 2, 872 N.E.2d at 915.
Granting a petition filed by the Ohio General Assembly, the Ohio Supreme Court then issued
a writ of mandamus compelling the secretary of state to treat Ohio Senate Bill 117 as valid law,
finding that Governor Strickland’s veto attempt was invalid since the ten-day period had
expired.  See id. ¶¶ 32-51, 872 N.E.2d at 921-25.  In a subsequent action, the secretary of state
sought a stay and reconsideration of the court’s decision that the bill became law on the tenth
day.  See State ex rel. Ohio Gen. Assem. v. Brunner, 115 Ohio St.3d 103, 2007-Ohio-4460, 873
N.E.2d 1232, ¶ 1.  On review, the Ohio Supreme Court held that the ninety-day period in which
citizens must be permitted to file a referendum petition against a bill required that the effective
date of the legislation be the date on which the initial state supreme court decision was rendered.
See id. ¶¶ 2, 16, 873 N.E.2d at 1232-33, 1235.
threat and commented that the legislation was specifically “designed to prevent
someone from getting around existing law by cleverly recasting a product
liability case as a public nuisance case.”189
Regarding existing public nuisance suits against manufacturers of lead paint
and pigment, Seitz focused on product identification, stating that “[i]n a
normal case, you have to prove who made the product.”190  He explained that
when plaintiffs cannot identify who manufactured the particular product,
“[w]e’re not going to allow people to sue the whole industry . . . .  That flouts
the idea of who is responsible for the harm.”191  Seitz’s statement also
implicates the public nuisance element of control.  By permitting the complaint
to proceed on the basis of the defendants’ marketing and distribution practices,
the Ohio Supreme Court distorted the longstanding purpose of the control
element in a public nuisance case—to ensure that those who actually created
the nuisance or caused the injuries are looked to for redress.
The reaction from the Ohio legislature was decisive.  In December 2006, the
Ohio General Assembly amended the Ohio Product Liability Act192 (OPLA)
to make clear that public nuisance claims for allegedly defective products must
be brought under the state’s products liability laws.193  Product liability claims
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194. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.71(A)(13). 
195. No. CI200606040, 2007 WL 4965044 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Dec. 12, 2007).
196. Id. at 1-2. 
197. Id. at 4, 12.  
198. Compare City of Milwaukee v. NL Indus., Inc., 2008 WI App 181, ¶ 17, 315 Wis.2d
443, ¶ 17, 762 N.W.2d 757, ¶ 17, with City of St. Louis v. Benjamin Moore & Co., 226 S.W.3d
110 (Mo. 2007), and In re Lead Paint Litig., 924 A.2d 484 (N.J. 2007); see also discussion
supra Part II.B-C.
199. See NL Industries, 2008 WI App 181, 315 Wis.2d 443, 762 N.W.2d 757.
200. City of Milwaukee v. NL Indus. Inc., 2005 WI App 7, ¶¶ 2-4, 278 Wis.2d 313, ¶¶ 2-4,
691 N.W.2d 888, ¶¶ 2-4. 
201. Id. ¶ 5, 691 N.W.2d at 891; see also Alan Ehrenhalt, Torts for Tots: When It Comes to
Consumer Product Safety, Litigation Is No Way to Regulate, GOVERNING, Feb. 1, 2009, http://
www.governing.com/hidden/Torts-for-Tots.html. 
were redefined to “include[] any public nuisance claim or cause of action at
common law in which it is alleged that the design, manufacture, supply,
marketing, distribution, promotion, advertising, labeling, or sale of a product
unreasonably interferes with a right common to the general public.”194
In 2007, an Ohio trial court relied on this clarification to dismiss a public
nuisance claim against lead paint manufacturers in City of Toledo v. Sherwin-
Williams Co.195  There, the City alleged that paint manufacturers and
distributors were liable for the damages stemming from their “roles in the
manufacture, processing, marketing, supplying, distributing, and/or sale of
lead based paint products.”196  The court agreed with the defendants’
contention that the “[p]laintiff’s public nuisance claim [was] expressly
subsumed by the OPLA” and granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss.197
2. City of Milwaukee v. NL Industries, Inc.
In the same month that the New Jersey and Missouri supreme courts
rejected the application of public nuisance against lead paint manufacturers,
a Milwaukee jury returned a verdict in favor of a defendant lead paint
manufacturer in a similar action.198  Because the case resulted in a defense
verdict, the defendants did not appeal the validity of the plaintiffs’ legal theory
to the Wisconsin Supreme Court.  The theory, therefore, is left standing with
the court of appeals’ decision that allowed the public nuisance action to
proceed.199
In 2001, the City of Milwaukee sued NL Industries, Inc., and Mautz Paint,
alleging that the defendants’ production and distribution of lead paint in
Milwaukee created a public nuisance.200  The City sought compensatory and
equitable relief for abatement of the alleged nuisance, restitution for $52
million that the City spent in an abatement program, and punitive damages.201
The trial court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the City’s public
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202. NL Industries, ¶ 1, 691 N.W.2d at 890.  The City argued that the defendants were
responsible for the costs associated with the abatement “because their conduct in marketing and
selling substantial quantities of lead pigments and/or lead-based paint in the City of
Milwaukee . . . , when they knew the hazards of lead poisoning related to their product, was a
substantial factor creating the public nuisance.”  Id. ¶ 4, 691 N.W.2d at 890-91.  
203. See id. ¶¶ 17-19, 691 N.W.2d at 893-94. 
204. Id. ¶ 10, 691 N.W.2d at 892 (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(citing Brown v. Milwaukee Terminal Ry. Co., 224 N.W. 748 (Wis. 1929)). 
205. Id. ¶ 12, 691 N.W.2d at 892.
206. Id. ¶ 18, 691 N.W.2d at 894. 
207. City of Milwaukee v. NL Indus., Inc., 2008 WI App 181, ¶ 17, 315 Wis.2d 443, ¶ 17,
762 N.W.2d 757, ¶ 17. 
208. Id. ¶ 22, 762 N.W. 2d at 766 (quoting Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist. v. City of
Milwaukee, 2005 WI 8, ¶ 25, 277 Wis.2d 635, ¶ 25, 691 N.W.2d 658, ¶ 25). 
209. Id. 
nuisance claim for lack of causation, “concluding that the City could not show
that these particular defendants caused their lead-based paint to be applied to
any of the specific buildings included in the alleged public nuisance.”202
On appeal, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals focused on the issue of
causation and ultimately reversed the trial court’s order after finding that the
City presented genuine issues of material fact as to whether the defendants’
conduct was a substantial factor in creating the nuisance.203
Citing Wisconsin case law, the appellate court stated that “the basis for
liability in a public nuisance case is the damage done by or danger inherent in
the creation or maintenance of that which constitutes a nuisance.”204  The
court distinguished between creating and maintaining a public nuisance and
held that “to establish a claim of creating a public nuisance, a plaintiff must
prove that the defendant’s conduct was a substantial cause of the existence of
a public nuisance and that the nuisance was a substantial factor in causing
injury to the public.”205  The court continued, “Based on our review of the
current record, we are persuaded that there are disputed material facts
concerning the extent of both defendants’ sales in Milwaukee and whether
those sales were a substantial cause of the alleged nuisance.  We conclude,
therefore, that this is an issue for the jury.”206
In June 2007, the jury found that while lead paint in the city constituted a
public nuisance, the manufacturer defendants did not “intentionally and
unreasonably engage in conduct” that caused the public nuisance and therefore
could not be held liable.207  The Wisconsin Court of Appeals upheld the verdict
on appeal, explaining that under the Restatement (Second) of Torts, “it is
possible to have a nuisance and yet no liability.”208  For liability to attach, “the
City was required to establish a causal connection between the nuisance and
underlying tortious acts attributable to NL Industries.”209  On April 14, 2009,
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210. City of Milwaukee v. NL Indus., Inc., 2009 WI 34, 316 Wis.2d 719, 765 N.W.2d 579.
211. See 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d 313 (Ct. App. 2006).
212. See id. at 320.
213. Faulk & Gray, supra note 17, at 980. 
214. County of Santa Clara v. Atl. Richfield Co., No. CV788657, 2001 WL 1769999 (Cal.
Super. Ct. May 31, 2001).
215. See Atlantic Richfield, 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 323.
216. See id. at 348. 
217. See id. at 324-25. 
the Wisconsin Supreme Court denied review of the appellate court’s ruling
without opinion.210
III. What These Decisions Mean for Pending Cases
These four state supreme court opinions, the Ohio General Assembly’s
legislation, and the Milwaukee trial court verdict should serve as guides for
courts across the country addressing public nuisance theories for broad-based
claims against product manufacturers.  This section looks at the future of the
only remaining major state-level public nuisance suit, which is pending in
California, and the viability of the global climate change public nuisance suits
pending before several federal circuit courts.
A. State Case
County of Santa Clara v. Atlantic Richfield Co. stands alone as the last
remaining major public nuisance suit involving lead paint.211  In 2000, Santa
Clara County (later joined by numerous other counties and municipalities) filed
a class action lawsuit on behalf of all public entities in the State of California
against several manufacturers of lead paint and pigment and the Lead Industries
Association for millions of dollars in costs and damages associated with lead
paint.212  The plaintiffs “alleged that the defendants engaged in a concerted
campaign opposing government regulation by challenging warnings, attacking
the credibility of public health workers, and orchestrating a public relations
campaign to mislead consumers.”213
In 2001, the trial court denied the plaintiffs’ public nuisance claim as
“sound[ing] in products liability rather than nuisance.”214  The court dismissed
the remaining claims in July 2003.215  In March 2006, the Sixth District of the
California Court of Appeals reinstated the public nuisance claim.216  In an effort
to distinguish this case from precedent, the court found that the claim was not
“essentially” a products liability claim, and that public nuisance causes of action
may proceed where the plaintiff seeks abatement of a public nuisance that was
created through the defendants’ conduct.217  It then eliminated the element of
control from the public nuisance analysis: “[L]iability for nuisance does not
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218. Id. at 306 (alteration and emphasis in original) (quoting City of Modesto
Redevelopment Agency v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 865, 872 (Ct. App. 2004)).
219.  See id. at 313.
220. See County of Santa Clara v. Superior Court, 74 Cal. Rptr. 3d 842, 844 (Ct. App.,
2008), rev’d, 112 Cal. Rptr. 3d 697 (2010).    
221. See id. at 848 (quoting People ex rel. Clancy v. Superior Court, 705 P.2d 347, 353 (Cal.
1985)). 
222. See Santa Clara, 112 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 719-20.  
223. See id. (citing State v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, 951 A.2d 428, 477 n.52 (R.I. 2008)).  
hinge on whether the defendant owns, possesses or controls the property, nor
on whether he is in a position to abate the nuisance; the critical question is
whether the defendant created or assisted in the creation of the nuisance.”218
The defendants appealed the decision to the California Supreme Court,
which denied review without opinion on June 21, 2006, and remanded the case
to the trial court.219  In May 2007, the trial judge granted the defendants’ motion
to void the plaintiffs’ contracts with contingency-fee attorneys hired to
prosecute the case.220  Citing People ex rel. Clancy v. Superior Court, the court
held that contingency-fee arrangements between the governmental entities and
private attorneys are “antithetical to the standard of neutrality that an attorney
representing the government must meet when prosecuting a public nuisance
abatement action.”221  The case was stalled until July 2010 when the California
Supreme Court issued its long awaited ruling affirming the constitutionality of
the governments’ use of contingency-fee attorneys in suits brought on behalf
of the state.222  In an opinion that will be the subject of scrutiny and debate
across the nation as other jurisdictions analyze the constitutionality of such a
practice, the California Supreme Court sided with Rhode Island in permitting
the state’s use of contingency fee lawyers so long as the public entity retains
complete control and veto power over the course of the litigation.223  Thus, the
ruling provided that the state could use contingency fee attorneys in pursuing
its public nuisance suit but did not touch on the underlying merits of the
appropriateness of theory as applied to product-based harms.  The trial court
that will now face the substantive matter, however, should take heed of the
recent rulings from around the country that rejected this latest attempt to expand
public nuisance law into realm of products liability and dismiss the case as
beyond the scope of the tort’s narrow underpinnings. 
B. Federal Cases
Recent claims against American corporations for allegedly contributing to
“global climate change” represent the latest attempt to push the bounds of
public nuisance theory.  To date, four primary global climate change cases have
been filed in federal courts around the nation.  Two of these cases were filed by
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The State Plaintiffs, claiming to represent the interests of more than 77 million
state attorneys general for injunctive relief, and two sought damages in response
to specific weather events.224  At the district court level, each attempt failed.
The four district court judges hearing the claims dismissed the complaints as
raising nonjusticiable political questions.225  Despite a consensus among the
district courts, however, the Fifth and Second Circuit Courts each revived a
public nuisance suit on appeal.226  In the Second Circuit case, the defendants are
petitioning the United States Supreme Court for review.227  Meanwhile, the
Fifth Circuit, which vacated its panel ruling, initially granted the defendants’
motion for en banc review, but due to recusals lost its quorum and invited the
plaintiffs to petition the United States Supreme Court for review.228 
The political question doctrine notwithstanding, the cases raise issues that
have long been the focus of the executive and legislative branches, and do not
sound in public nuisance.  As one team of legal scholars observed, 
[The] exceedingly complex issues [of emission controls] must be
confronted at the national and international levels by Congress,
expert federal agencies, and the President.  They cannot rationally
be based through piecemeal and ad hoc tort litigation seeking
injunctive relief—or, even worse, billions of dollars in retroactive
and future money damages—against targeted industries for
engaging in lawful and comprehensively-regulated conduct.229
The first of these suits was Connecticut v. American Electric Power Co.
(AEP), where the attorneys general of eight states, along with several nonprofit
land trusts, filed a public nuisance action against six utility companies seeking
abatement of the public nuisance of global climate change.230  The plaintiffs
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people and their related environments, natural resources, and economies, and the
Private Plaintiffs, non-profit land trusts, bring these federal common law public
nuisance actions to abate what they allege to be Defendants’ contributions to the
phenomenon commonly known as global warming.
Id. at 268.
231. Id. at 268.
232. Id. at 270. 
233. Id. at 274. 
234. See id. at 272-73. 
235. Id. at 268-69.
236. Id. at 272-73. 
237. Id. at 274 (quoting Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 278 (2004)). 
238. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309,  321, 323 (2d Cir. 2009). 
alleged that the defendants’ power facilities contributed to global climate
change by emitting greenhouse gases.231  To curtail the effects of global climate
change, the plaintiffs sought
an order (i) holding each of the Defendants jointly and severally
liable for contributing to an ongoing public nuisance, global
warming, and (ii) enjoining each of the Defendants to abate its
contribution to the nuisance by capping its greenhouse gas
emissions of carbon dioxide and then reducing those emissions by
a specified percentage each year for at least a decade.232
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed the
plaintiffs’ claims as nonjusticiable political questions, as the court believed it
could not decide the case without first making a policy determination that fell
outside of its jurisdiction.233  According to the court, caps on emissions and
annual reductions thereafter are remedies of a legislative or regulatory nature.234
The court noted “that Congress has recognized that carbon dioxide emissions
cause global warming . . . but . . . has declined to impose any formal limits on
[greenhouse gas] emissions.”235  Therefore, resolving the issue would require
a judicial determination of the appropriate emissions level and whether the costs
of all emissions should rest with a small segment of the electrical industry, as
well as an examination of the economic and national security implications of
such a determination.236  The court concluded, “Because resolution of the issues
presented here requires identification and balancing of economic,
environmental, foreign policy, and national security interests, ‘an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion’ is required.”237
The Second Circuit disagreed.  After citing the “high bar” for a finding of
nonjusticiability, the court stated that “simply because an issue may have
political implications does not make it non-justiciable.”238  The court turned to
the Restatement (Second) of Torts and the federal common law of public
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nuisance as providing sufficient standards for determining whether the
complaint sufficiently stated a public nuisance claim.239  The court also refused
to impose a requirement on all federal common law nuisance claims that would
require plaintiffs to trace any pollution directly to the defendants.240
In California v. General Motors Corp., the State of California sought
damages against six automakers for creating and contributing to the “alleged
public nuisance [of] global warming.”241  The State alleged that the
manufacturers produce vehicles that emit “over twenty percent of human-
generated carbon dioxide emission in the United States” and should be held
jointly and severally liable for creating, contributing to, and maintaining a
public nuisance.242  The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California dismissed this complaint, holding that it presented a nonjusticiable
political question.243  Similar to the New York court in AEP, the California
court stated that the claim required “an initial policy determination of a kind
clearly for nonjudicial discretion.”244  The court also found that the claim
implicated issues constitutionally committed to the political branches because
they affect interstate commerce and foreign policy, and that there were no
judicially discoverable, manageable standards by which to resolve the claim.245
Before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals could rule on the issue, California
Attorney General Jerry Brown voluntarily withdrew the case after
acknowledging the political nature of the claim.246  A spokesman for Brown
stated, “With the new administration in Washington, the rules have radically
changed . . . .  The EPA and the federal government are now on the side of
reducing greenhouse gasses and are taking strong measures to reduce emissions
from vehicles.”247  The announcement of the withdrawal came the week before
President Obama’s climate change plan narrowly passed the House of
Representatives.248
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Private plaintiffs bringing global climate change public nuisance suits
suffered a similar fate at the district court level.  For example, in Comer v.
Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., a class of Mississippi residents sued more
than a hundred oil, energy, and chemical companies (named and unnamed) for
the damages caused in the wake of Hurricane Katrina.249  The complaint alleged
that the defendants knowingly and willingly contributed to global climate
change through emission of greenhouse gases, which in turn warmed the waters
off the gulf, thereby causing the storm to intensify before making landfall.250
The district court ultimately dismissed the claim as a nonjusticiable political
question.251
On appeal to the Fifth Circuit, however, a three-judge panel reinstated that
case in a brief opinion that echoed the Second Circuit’s opinion in AEP.252  The
panel found that the plaintiffs had standing to assert their claims for public
nuisance, private nuisance, negligence, and trespass.253  The opinion explained
that “[t]he policy determinations underlying those common law tort rules
present no need for nonjudicial policy determinations to adjudicate this case.”254
The court limited the causation analysis to the minimum requirement necessary
to show traceability sufficient for Article III standing, thereby postponing a
more stringent analysis until the summary judgment stage of the proceeding.255
As mentioned above, however, the Fifth Circuit granted the defendants’ motion
for an en banc review of the case and vacated the panel’s decision.256
Subsequently, several judges recused themselves from the case and the circuit
no longer held a quorum to reach a decision.257 
The United States District Court for the Northern District of California was
home to the most recent global climate change suit, Native Village of Kivalina
v. ExxonMobil Corp., where an Alaskan village sued two dozen oil, coal, and
power companies for damages it allegedly suffered as a result of global climate
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change.258  In this private plaintiff suit, the villagers argued that the defendants
significantly contributed to global climate change, which prevented the
formation of an Arctic Sea ice barrier that had historically protected the land
surrounding the village from erosion.259  Like the other district courts, the
Kivalina court also relied on the political question doctrine to dismiss the
villagers’ claim.  The court, which issued its ruling only a few weeks after the
Second Circuit reinstated AEP, found no “judicially discoverable and
manageable standards” that would allow it to “render[] a decision that [was]
principled, rational, and based upon reasoned distinctions.”260  Furthermore, the
claim required initial policy decisions best left to the other branches, such as the
reasonableness of the defendants’ conduct.261  Importantly, the court disagreed
with the Second Circuit’s opinion in AEP.  While the Second Circuit believed
that “[w]ell settled principles of tort and public nuisance law provide
appropriate guidance to the district courts in assessing” global climate change
claims and that these claims can be “addressed through principled
adjudication,”262 the Kivalina court declared itself “not so sanguine.”263  The
court concluded, “While such principles may provide sufficient guidance in
some novel cases, this is not one of them.”264
Even the government attorneys bringing these cases have acknowledged that
their global climate change public nuisance claims are primarily designed to
advance policy agendas and motivate legislative and regulatory bodies to issue
tighter controls over various emission standards.  With respect to the AEP case,
for example, Connecticut Attorney General Richard Blumenthal stated that
this lawsuit began with a lump in the throat, a gut feeling, emotion,
that CO2 pollution and global warming were problems that needed
to be addressed.  They were urgent and immediate and needed some
kind of action, and it wasn’t coming from the federal
government. . . .  [My colleague and I were] brainstorming about
what could be done.265
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Maine Attorney General Stephen Rowe echoed, “I’m outraged by the federal
government’s refusal to list CO2 as a pollutant. . . .  I think the EPA should be
more active. . . .  [I]t’s a shame that we’re here, here we are trying to sue
[companies] . . . because the federal government is being inactive.”266  In short,
these suits seek to use the tort system, via public nuisance law, as a pulpit to
garner attention and bring about legislative or regulatory change. 
In hearing the appeals, the courts should continue to keep public nuisance
law within its rational bounds and uphold the district court decisions dismissing
these cases as nonjusticiable political questions.  Even if the appellate courts
were to reverse the trial court decisions and reinstate the claims, the allegations
would not satisfy the four elements of the tort of public nuisance.  For example,
emission standards for cars, energy products, and other targets of the litigation
are heavily regulated, meaning that producing these products in compliance
with the regulations is not unreasonable.267  Also, the challenge of showing that
making cars, electricity, and other such products proximately caused global
climate change or that the companies were in control of the nuisance appears
insurmountable.
Conclusion
Public nuisance theory has developed over nine centuries of English and
American common law to apply to a very specific set of facts—an injury to a
right common to the public, resulting from unreasonable conduct, and
proximately caused by a person in control of the nuisance, either at the time the
nuisance was created or when it is to be abated.  This limited applicability has
been confirmed by the state supreme courts in the lead paint and gun
manufacturer cases, and again by the federal district courts in the global climate
litigation.  These cases should signal to state attorneys general and other public
attorneys, as well as contingency-fee lawyers, that public nuisance is not a
catch-all cause of action capable of circumventing traditional tort principles and
defenses.
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